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Why Don’t Languages Adapt to Their
Environment?
José-Luis Mendívil-Giró*
Department of General and Hispanic Linguistics, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain
The issue of whether languages adapt to their environment depends on our
understanding of language, adaptation, and environment. I consider these three
concepts from an internalist or biolinguistic point of view. If adaptation is defined as the
result of the differential transmission of phenotypic traits by means of natural selection,
then both natural species and languages are adapted. Recall that according to Darwin’s
own insight, the evolutionary mechanisms for species and languages are “curiously the
same” (or “curiously parallel”). However, if the concept of adaptation entails that the
environment is the essential source of the structure of evolving objects, then neither
natural species nor languages can be said to be adapted to their environment. In the case
of languages, I will argue that much of their structure is insensitive to historical change
and, therefore, incapable of adaptation to the external environment. The immediate
environment of languages is in fact internal to the mind/brain and is thus less variable
than the social and physical environment in which people live. On the other hand, the
dimensions of languages that are variable have such an indirect relation with the physical
and social environment that the notion of adaptation to extra-linguistic reality can only be
applied weakly, and then it is unable to explain the main patterns of linguistic structural
diversity.
Keywords: language change, language evolution, adaptation, language typology, evolutionary theory, language
diversity, faculty of language, I-language
INTRODUCTION: REASONS FOR SKEPTICISM
My aim here is to consider proposals that seek to explain the structure of languages in terms of
adaptation to their physical and cultural environment, and to do so with a degree of skepticism.
Ladd et al. characterize these proposals as “attempts to relate facts about language structure to
facts about speakers and their environment—variables such as group size, geographical location,
genetic makeup, and cultural expectations” (Ladd et al., 2015, p. 227). This is not, of course,
to deny the inherent interest or value of such work (see current syntheses in Ladd et al., 2015;
Lupyan and Dale, 2016). Actually, my critical position toward the claim that there is an influence
of extralinguistic factors in the structure of languages is based on a restrictive conception of what
is the structure of languages. Then, I neither reject nor question the works that detect (more or less
robust) correlations between certain external factors and certain aspects of languages, but I argue
that if we understand the structure of languages as it is done in the context of current syntactic
theory (especially in the generativist domain), then the claim that the structure of languages can
be explained as the result of an adaptation to environmental factors (social, physical, or otherwise)
is misleading and inadequately simplifying. This is so because in the aforementioned tradition,
the notion of “the structure of languages” transcends relatively superficial aspects (such as the
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morphological manifestation of certain grammatical categories
or the variation in word order) and focuses on (essentially
syntactic) formal structural aspects that underlie all languages
and that, ultimately, define what is a possible human
language.
Therefore, my skepticism arises from two principal claims:
(i) the influence of the physical and cultural environment in
which languages are developed has a limited scope for explaining
the structure of languages, including their main patterns of
typological variation, and (ii) such studies do not lead to a
satisfying account of what a human language is, from a cognitive
and biological perspective, but rather, they take us back to a
traditional (and incomplete) view of language as a purely cultural
phenomenon.
COMPARING LANGUAGES AND SPECIES
Following August Schleicher, the first major linguist to address
the analogy between languages and species suggested by Darwin,
I will assume that “not a word of Darwin’s need be changed
here if we wish to apply this reasoning to languages” [Schleicher,
1863, p. 64 (I quote from the English translation included in
Koerner, 1983)]. The reason for my assumption is that in both
cases the evolving objects are historically modified natural objects.
This identification allows us to say that the process of linguistic
change and that of natural evolution are formally alike, although
substantially different (for a review of different interpretations of
the analogy between languages and species, see Mendívil-Giró,
2006, 2014).
Although various proposals for establishing the specific terms
of the comparison have been suggested (e.g., Croft, 2000), the
most appropriate one for my purpose is that formulated by
Schleicher himself, in his review of the German edition of the
Origin of Species:
“The species of a genus are what we call the languages of a family,
the races of a species are with us the dialects of a language; the
sub-dialects or patois correspond with the varieties of the species,
and that which is characteristic of a person’s mode of speaking
corresponds with the individual” (Schleicher, 1863, p. 32).
What Schleicher calls “that which is characteristic of a person’s
mode of speaking” is the closest concept to the Chomskyan
notion of I-language that could be formulated at that time.
Chomsky’s (1985) distinction between I-language and E-language
was formulated to make clear that the object of study of
linguistics as part of cognitive science is not an external object, a
shared code or a social institution, but a property of a speaker’s
mind/brain. Adopting this point of view, I argue that in the
comparison between linguistic change and natural evolution the
appropriate terms for comparison are as follows: the equivalent
of the natural organism (the individual) is the I-language, while
the equivalent of the species is a set of similar I-languages (what is
usually called a language). Thus, in this context, a language such
as Spanish is simply the set of I-languages of Spanish-speaking
people (i.e., of the people we identify as users of this way of
speaking that we call Spanish), just as the natural species of
tigers is nothing other than the set of organisms that we identify
as tigers. In both cases the criterion of delimitation, based on
similarity, is diffuse and somewhat arbitrary: the criterion of
fertile breeding in natural species (Mayr, 1942), and the criterion
of mutual intelligibility in languages (Dixon, 1997).
Central to this comparison is that both natural species and
natural languages are groups of similar individuals. A natural
species is made up of “sufficiently similar” individuals. An orang-
utan and a human being have more in common than an orang-
utan and a cow, but all three belong to different species. We
know that the greater similarity between an orang-utan and a
human is due to the fact that their common ancestor is far
more recent (about 6 million years) than in the case of humans
and cows, which goes back hundreds of millions of years. A
“linguistic species” (i.e., a language in the normal use of the term)
consists of “sufficiently similar” individuals (I-languages). Thus,
the linguistic equivalent of the natural organism (e.g., a tiger)
is each person’s language organ (the I-language). The linguistic
equivalent of the natural species (e.g., Panthera tigris) is the
grouping of such language organs. And likewise Spanish and
French are more alike than French and Russian, but all three are
different languages. We know that the greater similarity between
Spanish and French is due to the fact that their common ancestor
is much more recent (about 1,500 years) than the ancestor they
share with Russian (about 6,000 years).
If an I-language is a person’s language organ (his/her faculty
of language), there are not around 6,000 languages in the world,
but billions, as many as there are people (in fact many more,
given that bilingual people have more than one I-language). The
only thing that can be said to exist, from an internalist, cognitive,
point of view, are those billions of I-languages. All else (varieties,
dialects, languages, families, etc.) are abstract constructs that we
make by grouping I-languages according to their resemblances or
their historical origins. The same is true in the biological realm:
what exist are the emerging states of matter that we call life forms,
the organisms (the billions of animals, plants, fungi, etc., living
on the planet), whereas varieties, species, families, kingdoms, etc.,
are abstract constructs that we make on the basis of genetic and
morphological similarity and historical origins.
And just as we would not say that tigers are manifestations
or realizations of the species of tigers (which would have an
independent existence), it is not appropriate to say that I-
languages are manifestations or realizations of the Spanish or the
Russian language (which would have an independent existence
in grammars, in dictionaries or in social communities). The
Chomskyan cognitive shift had as a central tenet the assertion
that languages are not exclusively external, social objects that
humans learn, use and transmit from generation to generation,
but are in fact different (historically modified) states of the
same language faculty, a specific attribute of human cognition.
Similarly, natural organisms are different (historically modified)
states of the same biochemical phenomenon: life (see Moreno
and Mendívil-Giró, 2014 for a development of these ideas).
Comparable to natural evolution in biological organisms,
then, is the process of linguistic change in human languages. The
assumption that follows, hence, is that the process of language
evolution (as a human faculty) is part of natural evolution, and
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not part of linguistic change. In other words, the process of
linguistic change is one that affects (in historical time) the systems
of knowledge we call I-languages, and has no relation to the
evolutionary processes that could give rise (in geological time) to
the faculty of language. To avoid the “unfortunate ambiguity” (cf.
Hurford, 1992, p. 273) that expressions like language evolution
have in English, I use the term linguistic change to refer to the
process of historical change in languages, and I will reserve the
term evolution for biological changes, including the evolutionary
emergence of the language faculty (an issue that I will not
discuss here). In this sense it is possible to affirm, following
Berwick and Chomsky (2016, p. 92), that “languages change,
but they do not evolve.” For arguments against the assumption
that the process of linguistic change is part of the process of
language evolution, see Mendívil-Giró (2016) and Longobardi
(2003), who clearly distinguishes between historical adequacy
and evolutionary adequacy in language sciences.
The parallelism between natural evolution and linguistic
change in fact goes beyond the interesting similarities
that Darwin (1871) observed, and persists in the relevant
spheres of scholarship. Gould (2002) analyses in detail the
controversy between adaptationist, externalist, and functionalist
evolutionary theorists (using Gould’s, 1996 characterization of
neo-Darwinism) and, on the other hand, anti-neo-Darwinist
theorists (such as Brian Goodwin, Stuart Kauffman, and Gould
himself). In linguistics too there is also a parallel controversy,
revolving around functionalist and non-functionalist theorists of
language change (see Lass, 1997 for a detailed critical review, and
for an argument against functional/adaptive models of linguistic
change).
The impetus in the functionalist, adaptive approach to
linguistic change is contemporary to the emergence and
development of the Prague School of Linguistics (see Cercle
Linguistique de Prague, 1929). I refer mainly to the conception of
language as a social institution in the service of communication
and to the preference for teleological explanations of linguistic
change. It is relevant noting that the revival of teleological
tendencies in the explanation of language change coincides in
time and in orientation with the emergence in the twenties
and thirties in the twentieth century of the Modern Synthesis of
evolutionary theory. The new synthesis implies an inclination to
consider natural selection as the only motive power of natural
evolution, which implies the idea that every change must be
adaptive. In my view, this trend corresponds to functionalist
approaches to linguistic change and to the more recent tendency
to consider languages as complex adaptive systems (Kirby, 1999).
Gould (1996) has described the fundamental difference
between the neo-Darwinist model and its alternatives making use
of the metaphor of the billiard ball against Galton’s polyhedron.
According to the neo-Darwinist point of view, an organism could
be represented as a billiard ball in motion. Each time the cue hits
the ball there is a variable movement. There is a free variation
that goes in all directions. The cue hitting the ball would be
natural selection, and the ball goes where selection drives it.
This constitutes, in terms of Gould, an externalist, functionalist,
and adaptationist evolutionary theory. By contrast, the anti-
neo-Darwinist point of view presents the metaphor differently.
The organism would be as a polyhedron resting on one of its
facets. Once the cue hits it, the prospects for change are very
constrained: it is a polyhedron, which has a certain internal
structure that limits variation, so that certain options are more
likely than others and some are impossible, however interesting
that might be from an adaptive point of view.
Of course, this is not the place to review the long dispute
over the meaning and implications of the term adaptation in
evolutionary theory, nor to reiterate the debate on the channeling
of previous history and the laws of nature “on which natural
selection was privileged to work” (Kauffman, 1993, p. 643).
However, it is important to note that by adopting a cognitive
point of view in the study of languages one cannot ignore the
strict restrictions that the human brain and cognition impose on
the structural design of languages, independently of those aspects
susceptible to historical change (and, therefore, candidates for
possible processes of adaptation to the environment).
Gould characterized the controversy in evolutionary theory as
follows:
“In what ways does the skewed and partial occupancy of the
attainable morphospace of adaptive design record the operation
of internal constraints (both negative limitations and positive
channels), and not only the simple failure of unlimited number of
unconstrained lineages to reach all possible position in the allotted
time?” (Gould, 2002, p. 1053).
And both options have an equivalent view in current linguistic
theory. The internist and formalist approach (characteristic
of generative linguistics) conceives languages as systems of
knowledge restricted in their range of variation by the structure
of the human faculty of language (i.e., as Galton’s polyhedrons).
This view correlates with a uniformitarian conception of
language diversity and with a restrictive conception of linguistic
change. The externalist and functionalist approach (represented
by cognitive-functional linguistics) conceives languages as
external cultural objects that owe their structure to the adaptation
to speakers’ cognitive and communicative requirements (i.e.,
as billiard balls). This view correlates with a less constrained
conception of linguistic change and with an emphasis on the
diversity of languages (see Mendívil-Giró, 2012 for a review of
this controversy).
I will argue that what we know about how, and how much,
languages can change in time and in relation to the environment
places us in the first scenario: i.e., one in which the human
faculty of language strictly channels the aspects and components
of languages that can vary in time and space.
BUT WHAT CHANGES WHEN LANGUAGES
CHANGE?
According to Hauser et al. (2002) influential model, the
human language faculty could be conceived of as a complex
system minimally integrated by three components: a conceptual-
intentional (CI) system (related to meaning and interpretation),
a sensory-motor (SM) system (related to the perception and
production of linguistic signals), and a computational system
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(Narrow Syntax, responsible for the creation of the syntactic
structure that underlies linguistic expressions, and ultimately for
the compositionality and productivity of human language).
Following later developments of this model (Chomsky, 2007;
Berwick and Chomsky, 2011, 2016), I will assume that the
computational system has an asymmetrical relationship with
the two “external” components (CI and SM), such that the
computational systemwould be optimized for its interaction with
the CI system, while the relationship with the SM system would
be ancillary or secondary. See Figure 1.
It is then implied that the computational system is coupled
with the CI system to form an internal language of thought
(ILOT), one that would be essentially homogeneous within the
species, and the evolutionary design of which would not be for
communication but for thought. Chomsky has suggested that
from an evolutionary point of view “the earliest stage of language
would have been just that: a language of thought, used internally”
(Chomsky, 2007, p. 13).
The connection of the ILOT with the SM system is what
would allow the “externalization” of language for interaction and
communication with others. Since the connection of the ILOT
with the externalization systems is posterior or secondary, it
would be precisely within this process that the principal source of
the structural diversity among human languages would emerge:
“Parameterization and diversity, then, would be mostly – possibly
entirely – restricted to externalization. That is pretty much what
we seem to find: a computational system efficiently generating
expressions interpretable at the semantic/pragmatic interface, with
Diversity resulting from complex and highly varied modes of
externalization, which, furthermore, are readily susceptible to
historical change” (Berwick and Chomsky, 2011, pp. 37–38).
The connection of the ILOT with the SM system is what
allows the externalization of language and, incidentally, what
causes the existence of different I-languages. The essential
hypothesis is that the same ILOT underlies all languages, so
that differences between them are not caused by differences
in the CI, the computational, or even the SM systems (which
would be biologically conditioned), but follow from differences
in how the ILOT is connected to the SM system. Let us
suppose, to simplify, that the interface between the ILOT and
the sensorimotor system is a kind of “lexicon,” i.e., a repertoire of
morpho-phonological formants that allow the externalization of
the hierarchical syntactic-semantic representations (produced by
the computational system in its interaction with the CI system) in
the form of chains ofmorphemes and phonemes (or, if applicable,
visual signs). The role of the lexical interface, then, is to transform
abstract hierarchical structures into sequential structures legible
at the sensorimotor system. A possible way to understand the
format of this lexical interface would be in terms of the type of
lexical entries postulated in so-called nanosyntax (Starke, 2009).
Such a model predicts that the diversity in I-languages is
the result of variations in externalization, i.e., variations in the
configuration of the lexical interface represented in Figure 1.
As shown in the diagram, the development of language in
an individual implies the learning (the internalization) of the
“lexical” material necessary for communication, and it is exactly
during this process that reanalyses can occur. A reanalysis is a
mismatch in the grammar of two speakers between an internal
representation and the linguistic expression produced by the SM
system. It can be seen as the equivalent of genetic mutations in
organisms.
Let us consider a simplified example: in present-day English
the future is expressed as a phrase (I will love) whereas in
Spanish it is expressed as a single word (Amaré). According
to the model presented, the underlying syntactic structures of
the two expressions are very similar (as well as their meaning),
while the morphological (and phonological) structures are very
different. However, what is now a bound morpheme in the
Spanish future (-é) was an auxiliary verb in earlier stages of this
language (derived from the vulgar Latin phrase amare habeo “I
have to love,” an alternative to the classic Latin synthetic form
amabo “I will love”). The transition from a phrase (main verb +
auxiliary) to a word (root + affix) at some point in the historical
evolution of Romance necessarily implied a process of reanalysis
(a mutation). Hence, and again to simplify, we could say that for
speaker S1 expression E has the underlying structure Verb+Aux,
whereas for speaker S2 the same expression E has the underlying
structure Root+Affix, i.e., speaker S2 reanalyses expression E,
conferring on it a different underlying structure (Root+Affix)
than that of speaker S1 (Verb+Aux). In a sense, then, the I-
language of speaker S2 has a mutation, because the relationship
between the elements of expression E and its underlying structure
is different from that in the I-language of speaker S1. The listener
(or the child acquiring a language) does not have immediate
access to the syntactic structure or to the semantic representation
underlying a given expression, but only to the sound wave that
externalizes it. The task of the listeners (or learners) is to use their
I-language (including their own lexical interface) to discover this
structure by analyzing the sound wave received. In the ideal case,
the structure that they get is identical to what the speaker had in
mind. When this is not the case, we can say that reanalysis has
occurred. So reanalysis is basically a decoding (or acquisition)
error, and when this error (this “mutation”) is stabilized in the
listener’s I-language and is extended to other speakers, we say
that there has been a linguistic change. The model predicts
that changes happen in the lexical interface that materializes
syntactic structures, not in the computational system itself. This
view is coherent with the inertial theory of syntactic change (see
Longobardi, 2001; Keenan, 2002).
On the other hand, in linguistic change, as in the case with
natural evolution, one has to clearly differentiate the reasons
why an innovation arises and the reasons why this innovation
extends over a population over time. There are many factors that
might lead, for example, to the introduction or elimination of a
particular acoustic feature in a phonetic segment (from climatic
conditions to the presence of speakers of other languages), but
a linguistic change will only occur if that mutation extends
to other individuals (I-languages), and this itself will only
happen if the speakers imitate the speech of the innovators,
and the innovations pass these on to subsequent generations.
As Labov (1963) showed, the crucial factor in the selection of
innovative variants, whether phonetic, morphological, lexical,
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FIGURE 1 | The structure of an I-language. For each component the traditional area of research is indicated. The main components of language are asymmetrically
related. The conceptual-intentional (CI) system has a direct connection with the computational system and they form an internal language of thought (ILOT). This ILOT
is connected with the sensory-motor (SM) system for language externalization. This connection is established through a lexical interface. The lexical interface changes
historically during the process of transmission from generation to generation.
or syntactic, is not functional efficiency or cost of execution,
but social prestige. Some authors (e.g., Croft, 2000) argue that
innovations are functional/adaptive, i.e., they have a teleological
motivation. But as Lass notes, “unless a motivation is arbitrary,
its implementation ought not to subject to contingent factors like
age, sex, prestige, etc.” (Lass, 1997, p. 364).
Differences between languages (such as differences between
natural species) are the result of change, but linguistic changes
only occur in the most superficial dimension of languages, those
that are exposed to learning from the environment and are
susceptible to historical reanalysis. In the same way, biological
evolution significantly alters the form and structure of organisms,
but does not modify the biochemistry on which they are built,
this remaining unchanged since the emergence of the first forms
of life.
THE STRUCTURAL TYPOLOGY OF
LANGUAGES DOES NOT CORRELATE
WITH THE CULTURAL DIVERSITY OF
SPEAKERS
Even assuming that externalization patterns are the only thing
that changes historically in languages, it could still be argued that
there is a great deal of room for variation and that, therefore,
the structural diversity of languages could reflect processes of
adaptation to the environment. Indeed, we know that notable
variation in the structure of languages does exist, although the
model proposed in Figure 1 would rule out the kind of weakly
restricted variation which some authors continue to advocate (see
Evans and Levinson, 2009; Mendívil-Giró, 2012 for a critique).
The lack of correlation between different linguistic types and
different aspects of human cultures is a strong argument in
favor of a restrictive vision of the notion of adaptation applied
to human languages, and in favor of a non-exclusively cultural
vision of what a language is.
The parameters of linguistic structural variation that have
always caught the attention of typologists are those of a
morphosyntactic nature (i.e., related to how the morphology of
languages reflects the syntactic structure). There are languages
with case marking morphemes, and languages without them;
there are languages in which verbs are conjugated and agree
with several arguments, and languages in which they do not;
there are languages in which heads precede complements, and
languages in which this happens in reverse; and there are
languages in which interrogative words move to the front of
sentences, and languages in which they do not (see Dryer and
Haspelmath, 2013 for a general survey). Between each of the
mentioned options there is a complex range of intermediate steps.
For example, among the languages that morphologically mark
grammatical relations between verbs and arguments (either with
cases or with agreement), some follow the nominative-accusative
pattern (formally grouping the subject and differentiating the
direct object) and others the ergative-absolutive pattern (formally
grouping the subject of the intransitive verb and the object,
and differentiating the subject of the transitive verb). Yet there
are also languages that are accusative in certain tenses/aspects
and ergative in others (see Dixon, 1994). All such variation is
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compatible with the model set out in Figure 1, and a number
of research programs are currently addressing the issues of
structural typology based on differences in the externalization
component (e.g. Richards, 2016).
What is relevant to us here is that, as Pinker (2007) has pointed
out, “the non-universal, learned, variable aspects of language
don’t fit into any meaningful purposive narrative about the
surrounding culture.” The causes of the changes that produce
such variation are inherent to linguistic structure itself, and to
the mechanism of change (reanalysis). To quote Pinker once
more, these changes “aren’t part of any symbolic or teleological
plan of the culture.” Adapting Pinker’s words to our example
above, we can say that there are ergative languages and accusative
languages, but there are no ergative cultures and accusative
cultures. As Baker suggests, “indeed, there is no ecological
regularity in how the major linguistic types are distributed
around the world” (Baker, 2003, p. 350).
The assumption that there is a correlation between culture
or worldview and the grammatical structure of languages is
as old as reflections on language typology. In the past it was
assumed that the degree of “cultural evolution” determined
the degree of “linguistic evolution.” Thus, if we turn again to
the case of ergativity, it was claimed that ergativity correlated
with a lack of rationality: “What for us is a true cause is for
primitive man merely an event involving mystical forces” or
“savage man apparently feels that most events are not due to his
own volition” (quoted by Seely, 1977, apud Dixon, 1994, p. 214).
Dixon argues that by using the same data we could conclude that
only speakers of ergative languages have a true notion of agency,
since only these speakers formally identify the agentive argument;
he concludes that, “in fact, there is no one-to-one correspondence
between grammatical marking and mental view of the world”
(Dixon, 1994, p. 214).
Even in more recent times, there is no shortage of (more
sophisticated and reasonable) proposals about the existence of
covariation between culture and grammar, especially relating
grammatical complexity with cultural complexity, such as
Swadesh (1971), Perkins (1988), or Everett (2005). Swadesh
(1971) p. 49) mentions a correlation between inflectional
categories and languages’ geographical and social extension.
But this correlation, if it really exists, does not reveal an
adaptation of grammar to culture, but is probably a consequence
of morphological simplification, typical of many so-called
“world languages” (see section The Brain Internal Environment:
Language Learning and Language Processing for discussion).
Perkins (1988) proposes a correlation between grammatical
complexity and cultural complexity. He surveys in 50 languages
several morphological deictic features (tense, person, deictic
affixes), syntactic devices related to the coding of reference
(determiners, relatives, conjunctions), as well as a measure
of cultural complexity (based on the size of settlements, the
number of types of craft specialists, and social and political
hierarchy depth). Perkins finds a strong correlation that would
imply a kind of “linguistic evolution”: languages of complex
cultures have few deictic affixes and many syntactic devices.
However, Nichols applies her methods to these data and
points out that these correlations “may actually reflect only
accidentally coincident macroareal linguistic distributions and
have no ultimate connection to cultural complexity” (Nichols,
1992, p. 317). (Everett, 2005) proposal on the cultural constraints
in Pirahã’s grammar is not statistically significant, and the
proposed correlation itself has been questioned (see Nevins et al.,
2009).
The most reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that there is
no correlation between the structural diversity of languages and
the cultural diversity of speakers. The fact that one language,
for example Mohawk, has more morphological complexity than
another, for example English, has no relation to the complexity
of the culture in which those languages are spoken, or to the
sophistication of its literary tradition, but simply depends on a
chain of previous historical facts. The bound morphemes that
characterize the complex morphology of many languages are
the result of the historical reanalysis of ancient free words.
Yet the almost invariable, morphologically simple words that
characterize other languages are often the result of the loss
of morphological complexity, also resulting from historical
reanalysis. In both cases reanalyses, like genetic mutations, are
blind and random processes, and Darwin’s conclusions can
be applied to them: “There seems to be no more design in
the variability of organic beings, and in the action of natural
selection, than in the course the wind blows” (Darwin, 1893/2000,
p. 63).
This conclusion has a solid empirical support. Both Nichols
(1992) and Nettle (1999) quantitatively analyse linguistic
diversity in time and space and, although with different samples
and methodologies, they reach similar conclusions: although
there are social and geographical factors that correlate with
linguistic diversity and with the density of languages, there is no
correlation between typological structural diversity and external
factors. As Nettle points out: “Structural diversity [. . . ] shows no
overall pattern and no correlation with other types of diversity”
(Nettle, 1999, p. 137).
Nettle suggests that some extralinguistic factors, such as
the size of the speech community, could be related to the
preservation of less frequent typological configurations (for
example, OS word order, with the object preceding the subject).
The argument is based on the assumption that infrequent types
are less optimal in functional terms. This assertion is doubtful,
because functional optimality is defined in relation to the greater
or lesser frequency (I consider the relation between processing
and grammar in section The Brain Internal Environment:
Language Learning and Language Processing). If we ignore that
problem, Nettle’s suggestion is interesting. In this case the idea is
that, as it happens in population genetics, the effects of random
drift are greater when the population is small. But even in this
case, it cannot be said that there is a correlation between linguistic
types and extralinguistic factors, i.e., it cannot be said that small
groups of speakers favor the evolution of certain linguistic types,
nor that there is a causal relationship between a small group of
speakers and the subject position in the sentence. Note that it
could also be argued (what seems more likely) that the possible
cause of the maintenance of an infrequent structural type in a
given place is the isolation that defines small groups of speakers,
isolation that would protect that group from the influence of
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speakers from other languages (word order is a grammatical
feature very prone to diffusion; see Dixon, 1997). What this
case shows is that the size of groups of speakers can influence
the dynamics of linguistic changes, something perfectly coherent
with the model presented here, but that does not allow to affirm
that a certain structural feature (the OS order) is an adaptation to
a certain type of linguistic context (the size of the community of
speakers).
Nichols’ (1992) conclusions on the historical evolution of
linguistic diversity are also very relevant in this context:
“This survey has uncovered no evidence that human language
in general has changed since the earliest stage recoverable by
the method used here. There is simply diversity, distributed
geographically. The only thing that has demonstrably changed
since the first stage of humanity is the geographical distribution of
diversity” (Nichols, 1992, p. 277).
If the generation of the structural diversity of languages were
the result of adaptive processes to non-linguistic aspects (and
not a continuous drift within a restricted design space) we
should expect some kind of progression in the historical change
of languages, such as we observe in other cultural institutions
(politics, art, science, or technology), but this is not the case.
Although structural types of languages do not correlate with
the types of societies and cultures that populate our planet, it is
still possible to see how certain formal aspects of languages can be
explained as processes of adaptation to the environment within
the process of linguistic change. However, prior to this we need to
determine what is understood by environment and what aspects
of a language are sensitive to it.
WHAT IS THE ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH
THE VARIABLE PARTS OF LANGUAGES
WOULD ADAPT?
So far I have assumed a generic notion of environment, as
formulated in the leit Motiv of the Research Topic in which
this contribution is included (“to explore the possibility that
some aspects of the structure of languages may result from an
adaptation to the natural and/or human-made environment”).
I have shown that the claim that there is covariation between
morphosyntactic typology and aspects of the environment (so
defined) is empirically weak, something that is consistent with
the prediction made by the presented model of what I-languages
are, and what their margin of variation is.
The diagram in Figure 1 represents any I-language (i.e., the
equivalent of a natural organism). As I have pointed out, it is
obvious that every I-language has a variable component (the
externalization component), therefore susceptible of adaptation
to the environment (although to a lesser degree than it is assumed
in models that conceive languages as purely cultural objects). But
from this point of view, the notion of environment cannot be the
same I have been using. What is the language external medium to
which these variable parts could have adapted?
It is not a simple question. The structure of Figure 1 may be
interpreted as a sandwich, so that only the outer layers would
be susceptible to contact with the environment. Thus, we could
consider that the CI and SM systems are “more external” than
the computational system. The CI part of any language may be
in contact with the rest of the conceptual system of people, so
that it would then be expected that certain aspects of the physical,
social, and cultural environment in which people develop and
live can have an influence on the range of available concepts
and notions. This would explain a relatively trivial aspect of
the adaptation of languages to the environment, that of the
substantive lexicon (Regier et al., 2016). In a culture with highly
developed technology there will be words and phrases to denote
scientific instruments, techniques, and concepts not found in
languages spoken by hunter-gatherer communities, which, on the
other hand, would have areas of the lexicon relating to wildly
occurring food, animals, and methods of survival unrecognized
in the languages of modern urban communities. Changes in
culture, technology, and lifestyle often lead to changes in the
lexical inventory that we require in everyday life. When a society
moves from a rural to an industrialized life, the most widely used
lexical inventory also changes. In this area, as pointed out by Ladd
et al. (2015), several quantitative studies have shown that there is
a correlation between environmental factors (latitude, ultra violet
radiation) and the size of the lexical repertoire of color terms.
But the differences in the type of conceptual elements that have
specific lexical expression are not related to the morphosyntactic
structure of languages. Indeed, languages spoken by supposedly
simpler societies, hunter-gatherer societies, often have greater
morphosyntactic complexity (greater “maturity” in the sense
used by Dahl, 2004) than many European languages such as
English or Romance languages.
On the other side of the sandwich, we have a sensory-
motor system, which in oral languages corresponds to the vocal-
auditory system. It is conceivable that certain aspects of the
physical environment may bias the kind of sounds most used
in some languages (see Everett et al., 2016), but again there
would be very limited effects on the morphosyntactic structure
of languages.
So, which environmental factors could have molded the
historical drift of the morphosyntactic systems of languages? It is
quite possible that such factors do not exist or have a weak effect,
since the structural typology seems to be relatively isolated from
the semantic and material dimension of languages and does not
seem to fit them. But if we were to look for them, the place to start
is within the brain.
THE BRAIN INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT:
LANGUAGE LEARNING AND LANGUAGE
PROCESSING
According to the model I have described here, the object
of study, from a cognitive perspective, is not that of
languages understood as social institutions, but the I-
languages that reside in the minds/brains of individuals.
In this context it is imperative that we recall that the only
environment with which “mental organs” are in direct
contact is the brain itself. If there is an “external” medium
to which I-languages can adapt, it must be internal to the
mind/brain.
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It may be argued that many of the most notable changes
that have been documented in the history of languages have
contact with other languages as a crucial factor. And, indeed, it
is indisputable that language contact has much more effect on
linguistic phenotypes than the social or physical environment
in which people live. But languages do not come into direct
contact within the physical environment or in society, but only
in the brains of speakers. Language A can only have influence
on language B if the speaker of B has some kind of knowledge
of language A. In our terms we could say that the development
of a new lexical interface can affect the previous lexical interface,
which can alter the linguistic emissions that the new generation
of speakers will use to develop their own lexical interface.
Natural evolution is only possible thanks to the reproduction
of organisms, and linguistic change is only possible thanks to
the transmission of languages from generation to generation.
Much of the structure of an I-language is transmitted from
parents to children along with the rest of their biological
endowment, but obviously the variable parts of language are
learned (internalized) from environmental linguistic stimuli. As
I have already noted, this is the phase in which mutations in
the lexical interface can occur. These mutations, depending on
their range of transmission, can give rise to linguistic changes
and, ultimately, to what we see as a different language. The
task of the child who learns a language is to reproduce in her
mind/brain the lexical interface of her interlocutors, a typically
insecure (“abductive,” cf. Andersen, 1973) procedure that is at the
basis of linguistic change.
As Dahl (2004) has shown, the usual dynamics of linguistic
change produce an increase in morphosyntactic complexity
(maturity) up to a certain limit, and thereafter such complexity
tends to be maintained. The degree of maturity of a language
is measured in terms of the quantity of structures involving a
previous derivational history, i.e., non-universal processes that
can only be explained by long previous evolutionary chains,
such as inflectional and derivative morphology, incorporation,
the existence of phonological tone, case marking, or ergativity.
However, we might note that according to the model presented
in Figure 1 this natural increase in linguistic complexity actually
amounts to an increase in the complexity of the lexical interface,
not the whole language itself. In this sense, no languages are more
complex than others, but there are languages with more complex
lexical interfaces than others. This is an important difference.
The notable grammatical differences between, on one extreme,
Georgian and, on the other, Tok Pisin, do not imply differences
in the deep layers of structure (basically the CI system and the
computational system), but rather differences in the historical
evolution of their externalization components. The proof of this
is that the two languages serve their users in carrying out the same
cognitive and communicative functions.
The initial intuition here is simple: the more prior
uninterrupted history, the greater morphosyntactic complexity,
and vice versa. In fact, McWhorter (2011) argues that the natural
state of a language, i.e., when no drastic disturbances in its
transmission from generation to generation have occurred, is
“highly complex, to an extent that seems extreme to speakers of
languages like English” (2011, p. 1). It seems clear that the brain of
human children is able to internalize lexical interfaces as complex
as those of Native American languages or Caucasus languages,
typical examples of “mature” systems in Dahl’s sense. Neither the
brains of other organisms nor the brains of themajority of human
adults are as efficient in the internalization of arbitrary systems
of gender and noun classifiers, agreement patterns, or quirky
cases (not to mention phonological systems). Consequently,
McWhorter hypothesizes that whenever we find languages with
low degrees of morphosyntactic complexity it is because such
languages have been interrupted in their normal accumulation
of complexity; i.e., languages with relatively low degrees of
complexity “owe this state to second-language acquisition in the
past” (McWhorter, 2011, p. 2). In this category we could include
languages like English, Romance languages, Persian, Mandarin
Chinese, and Indonesian. Compared to other, related languages
(such as Sanskrit, Latin, Greek, or Baltic) these languages (which
McWhorter callsNon-Hybrid Conventionalized Second-Language
Varieties) are characterized by a loss of complexity that reveals
evidence of widespread second-language learning in the past.
In fact, Lupyan and Dale (2010) and Bentz and Winter (2013)
present quantitative evidence showing that languages spoken
by many second language speakers tend to have relatively
small nominal case systems compared with languages with low
proportions of L2 speakers. According to this model, creoles are
extreme cases of the same phenomenon: “where complexity has
been lost to a radical degree, we can assume that the language
was born in a situation in which adult acquisition was universal”
(McWhorter, 2011, p. 2). These cases of suboptimal transmission
would therefore be clear examples in which the brains of adult
learners have operated as an environmental factor to which some
parts of languages have adapted.
Another brain internal potential source of modeling forces
for morphosyntactic systems can be found in language use in
real time (see Newmeyer, 2005, for a conciliatory synthesis
on the division of labor between linguistic and processing
principles in grammar development). Themodel I have presented
stipulates that only the externalization component is subject
to change and, therefore, to variation. It is therefore expected
that processing principles (both in speech production and
perception) have a remarkable role in the structure and dynamics
of externalization systems (i.e., in themorphological mechanisms
of syntax realization), precisely because these systems are relevant
to the use of language for communication. In fact, language
processing principles (see Hawkins, 2004, for a very explicit
model) play their role by relating these two components (the
computational system and the lexical interface of Figure 1).
Just by way of illustration, I will consider Bickel et al. (2015)
regarding the development and persistence of ergative systems in
relation to universal processing preferences. Using experimental
evidence, Bickel et al. (2015) propose that there is a universal
principle that favors the processing of an initial unmarked NP
(in nominative or absolutive case) as an agent (as in John sold
a car). When the rest of the sentence shows that this unmarked
NP is not an agentive subject (as it would be in an ergative
language, which marks the subjects of the transitive verbs), they
observed an event-related potential (N-400) signaling a reanalysis
of the role of the first NP (for example, as a patient argument).
Bickel et al. hypothesize that this principle is “species-wide and
independent of the structural affordances of specific languages”
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(Bickel et al., 2015, p. 2) and that, as such, “the principle favors
the development and maintenance of case-marking systems that
equate base-form cases with agents rather than with patients”
(Bickel et al., 2015, p. 2), i.e., nominative-accusative systems
over ergative-absolutive ones. Using a large database of linguistic
changes in various language families (617 languages in total)
they note that of the two possible historical changes, ergative >
accusative or accusative > ergative, languages show a clear bias
toward the former:
“Languages tend to avoid ergatives when they evolve over time: if a
language has ergative case marking, it is more likely to lose than to
keep it, and if a language lacks ergative case marking, it is unlikely
to develop it. To be sure, ergative cases can arise and be maintained
for a while, but the probabilities of this are always lower than the
probabilities of avoiding ergatives” (Bickel et al., 2015, p. 18).
If Bickel et al.’s conclusions are correct, we would again
have a clear example of how a language-external (but mind-
internal) factor can condition the adaptation of languages
in their processes of change. However, this also leads us to
an important conclusion, one at the heart of our present
discussion: even though a general principle of processing exerts
a measurable pressure on linguistic systems, the inertia of
the language’s previous history is capable of overcoming it,
showing that morphosyntactic structure is stubbornly resistant
to external adaptive pressures, even though they are internal to
the mind/brain and supposedly universal.
It is important to note that ergative systems are mature
systems in Dahl’s sense, which would also explain, at least in
part, both the unequal statistical distribution of the two types
of languages, and the historical bias documented by Bickel et al.
The relevant fact for us here is that a language like Basque,
which is fully ergative, shows no symptoms of maladjustment
and remains fully functional for its users. More relevant still,
there are processes of historical development of ergativity
(otherwise, ergative languages would never have existed), which
show that grammatical structure is largely immune to the
influence of external (i.e., non-grammatical) factors. Actually, a
recent synthesis of the research on processing costs of ergativity
in Basque (Zawiszewski, 2017) concludes that there are no
profound differences in the mechanisms underlying processing
in languages with different case marking systems:
“In general, the electrophysiological pattern found when processing
ergative case violations corresponds to that revealed during similar
case violations in accusative languages (. . . ) and thus indicate
that the mechanisms underlying language comprehension are
comparable across languages with a different case morphology.”
(Zawiszewski, 2017, p. 706).
CONCLUSIONS
If we adopt McWhorter’s theory, we could say that adult brains
have influenced the historical development of some human
languages to a decisive extent. From an externalist view of
languages, it could be said that some languages have adapted
to (non-flexible) mature brains, simplifying their historical
accretions and rendering themselves easier to be learned. But
from the internalist point of view, this statement is unsatisfactory.
The externalist approach tends to identify languages with their
lexical interfaces, and this identification, at least in part, is behind
the different appreciation of the degree of adaptation of languages
to the environment. From an internalist point of view, the
notion of adaptation of languages to their environment is only
acceptable in a weak sense. According to my argument, weak
means that only relatively superficial aspects of languages can
be explained as adaptations to extralinguistic reality. I do not
intend to conclude that statements such as the following are
incorrect:
“[L]inguistic differences, from sounds to grammars, may also reflect
adaptations to different environments in which the languages are
learned and used. The aspects of the environment that could shape
language include the social, the physical, and the technological”
(Lupyan and Dale, 2016, p. 1).
Of course, as reflected in the model of Figure 1, every language
has a cultural component (internalized from the environment)
that is susceptible to change and, therefore, to vary in relation
to external factors (i.e., adaptation). However, statements like the
previous one suggest that this process of adaptation is sufficient
to explain the structure of languages and their typology, and
that conclusion is what I have tried to put into question in this
contribution.
Many and diverse external and internal factors
have left their mark on languages, especially in their
systems of externalization, but I do not believe that
this in itself allows us to claim that the structure of
languages is essentially a matter of adaptation to the
environment.
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